Define the systems and risks within scope
Identify which software supports covered services, who owns it, the data it processes and the consequences of compromise. Internally developed tools and customisations can introduce security exposure even when a vendor supplies the underlying platform.
Document trust boundaries, external interfaces and dependencies early enough to influence design. A privileged automation service warrants more scrutiny than an isolated low-impact internal utility.
Use threat assessment in design
Examine authentication, authorisation, sensitive data flow, dependency trust and the potential for an attacker to change critical operations. Threat modelling is one way to make these decisions explicit, but Article 21 does not prescribe one modelling notation for every entity.
Translate the findings into security requirements that developers and reviewers can test. Avoid a template exercise in which threats are listed without influencing architecture.
Protect the code and build process
Limit permissions to source repositories, require appropriate review for consequential changes and secure build credentials. Protect secrets from accidental inclusion in source code or artefacts and maintain traceability between approved changes and releases.
A secure application can still be compromised through a vulnerable build dependency or stolen release credential. Development controls should consider the tools used to create and distribute software.
Manage vulnerabilities and dependencies
Maintain awareness of libraries, frameworks and runtime versions relevant to the software. Assess reported weaknesses by actual exposure and service impact, then apply updates, mitigations or documented exceptions.
Give security defects an accountable owner and retest fixes. A published vulnerability score should inform assessment without mechanically determining business priority.
Coordinate development and operations
Establish expectations for configuration, logging, supported versions and secure deployment. Provide operations teams with necessary maintenance guidance and a process for reporting defects discovered after release.
Commissioned developers and service providers should have clear duties for support and vulnerability communication. Align those relationships with Article 21(2)(d) supply chain security.
Document evidence and legal scope
Retain design decisions, code review records, relevant test outcomes, vulnerability decisions and release approval evidence. Review the programme after major changes and incidents.
Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 sets detailed requirements for specified categories of digital and ICT providers. Those requirements should not be described as uniformly binding on every NIS2 entity.
Questions arising
Does NIS2 prescribe one secure development methodology?
No. The Directive establishes cybersecurity risk-management requirements, while specific methods should reflect the risks and additional applicable rules.
Should the development process include third-party components?
Yes. Dependencies and contracted development can affect system security and should be considered according to their role and risk.