Understand the scope of Article 21(2)(e)
The Directive includes security in acquisition, development and maintenance among the minimum areas of cybersecurity risk management. It also calls for an all-hazards approach and measures appropriate to the entity's exposure, size and potential impact of incidents.
A purchasing checklist alone is insufficient when software remains unsupported or vulnerabilities go unaddressed after deployment. Organisational controls need to connect procurement decisions, engineering, operations and supplier management.
Set security requirements before acquisition
Identify the service that a proposed ICT product or service will support and what would happen if it failed or were compromised. Specify relevant expectations for authentication, access, logging, updates, data handling, recovery and integration before selecting a supplier.
An identity platform may warrant stronger availability and administrator-access provisions than a stand-alone low-impact tool. Record the risk rationale so subsequent evaluators understand which requirements cannot be waived casually.
Build secure development and change practices
For internally developed or commissioned systems, address design assumptions, code review, component dependencies, secrets, test environments and release approval. Ensure changes are tested for both security and operational stability.
Contracted development also introduces supply chain issues. Define who owns vulnerability handling and who can supply security updates during and after the development engagement.
Maintain configurations and supported versions
Establish an inventory of systems, their owners, deployed versions and dependencies. Use secure configuration baselines and review exceptions where legacy or specialised equipment cannot meet the ordinary standard.
Maintenance planning should include the vendor's support lifetime and a credible replacement route before essential components reach end of support. Technical debt that is invisible to risk owners can turn a manageable patch into an operational crisis.
Handle vulnerabilities from discovery to verification
Collect information from internal testing, monitoring, vendor advisories and responsible external reports. Assess exposure, likelihood of exploitation, impact on covered services and the availability of mitigations.
Assign ownership for patching or compensating controls, confirm changes have worked and track unresolved exceptions. Disclosing a vulnerability responsibly and reporting a significant security incident under Article 23 are distinct processes.
Test controls and preserve evidence
Document security acceptance criteria, procurement decisions, design review findings, configuration changes, vulnerability risk decisions, test results and remediation closure. Evidence should reveal whether a system is actually managed in line with approved policy.
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 provides more detailed technical and methodological rules for certain digital and ICT provider categories. Its Annex should not be presented as uniformly binding on every entity within NIS2.
Review law, service risk and improvements
Assess the national implementing law of the Member State with jurisdiction and any applicable sector rules. Reassess system security after incidents, major architectural changes and changes in supplier support.
The programme should connect acquisition, engineering, maintenance and security operations without creating separate records that contradict one another.
Questions arising
Does NIS2 require secure development and maintenance?
Yes. Article 21(2)(e) includes security in acquisition, development and maintenance, including vulnerability handling and disclosure, within the relevant risk-management measures.
Does every covered entity follow identical technical procurement controls?
No. Controls must reflect risk and applicable law. Regulation 2024/2690 adds detailed rules for specified provider categories.