Why phishing deserves a practical training approach
A deceptive message may attempt to steal sign-in details, divert a payment, deliver malware or convince an employee to approve unauthorised access. Training should reflect the actual communication channels and decisions in the organisation, including collaboration platforms, telephone requests and supplier correspondence.
NIS2 Article 21(2)(g) identifies basic cyber hygiene and cybersecurity training as areas of risk-management measures. The Directive does not prescribe a universal phishing simulation quota for every entity. National implementing law and sector-specific guidance still matter.
Teach verification rather than superficial clues
Attackers may use plausible branding, correct spelling and context from previous conversations. Staff need a dependable method to verify requests for credential resets, urgent payments, file sharing or changes to supplier details using an established independent channel.
Explain how to inspect the sender and destination, recognise unusual access requests and avoid entering passwords into unexpected forms. Where possible, reduce reliance on individual judgment through phishing-resistant authentication and controls that block malicious content.
Make reporting immediate and low friction
Provide a clearly signposted reporting mechanism that works on mobile devices and for shift workers. Ask staff to report suspicious requests even when they have not clicked, because early reporting can help protect others who received the same attempt.
Incident responders should acknowledge reports, triage indicators and explain what the employee should do next. A reporting button without a monitored response process may give an appearance of preparedness without reliable operational protection.
Use exercises carefully
Scenario-based exercises can reveal gaps in understanding and response. Evaluate whether staff followed verification steps and how quickly suspicious messages reached responders, not merely who clicked a simulated link.
Avoid public shaming or deceptive campaigns that unnecessarily collect personal information. Measure improvements by team and process where suitable, and interpret higher reporting rates as potentially positive evidence of awareness.
Document improvement and connect technical controls
Keep a record of training audiences, scenarios, reporting instructions, observed weaknesses and follow-up actions. If an exercise reveals that employees cannot reach the reporting team at night, the remedy may be an escalation-process change rather than another slideshow.
Assess training alongside email filtering, access controls, account monitoring and incident exercises. Review the programme when threats, workflows or national requirements change.
Points of clarification
Does NIS2 specify the same training schedule for every organisation?
No universal schedule is set for every entity by Article 21 alone. Assess applicable national rules and the organisation's risks.
Can training replace technical protection?
No. Training complements technical and organisational controls and cannot by itself establish that the related security measure is effective.
What evidence is useful?
Keep relevant policy, training, technical implementation, assessment and corrective-action records, with appropriate access controls.