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Cryptography Access Assets Physical Security / 2026-10-09

Encryption in Transit Under NIS2

Article 21(2)(h) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 includes policies and procedures on the use of cryptography and, where appropriate, encryption among the risk-management measures essential and important entities must take. Encryption in transit is how that duty applies to data moving between systems, people and services: connections that carry operational or sensitive information should be protected with current, supported protocols, and the protection should be verified rather than assumed.

Start from the connections that matter

Encryption decisions begin with a map of the connections the organisation depends on: links between applications and databases, administrative access to network and security systems, connections used by remote workers, interfaces with suppliers and managed service providers, and replication or backup traffic between sites. Each connection should be recorded with the information it carries and the systems at each end.

Not every connection carries the same risk. A session that can change firewall rules or restore a backup deserves stronger protection and tighter verification than a connection carrying public information. Article 21(1) requires measures to be proportionate to the risk, so the inventory should record a risk judgement per connection rather than applying one blanket statement to everything.

What Article 21(2)(h) actually requires

The Directive does not name protocols or algorithms. It requires policies and procedures for the use of cryptography and, where appropriate, encryption. That means the entity has to decide, document and be able to show: where encryption in transit is required, which protocol versions and configurations are acceptable, how certificates are obtained, renewed and revoked, and who owns each decision.

For the provider types listed in Article 1 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 - including DNS, cloud, data centre, content delivery and managed service providers - the annex to that regulation sets out more detailed technical and methodological requirements for the Article 21 measures, and cryptography is among the areas addressed. Entities in those categories should test their transport protection against the annex as well as the Directive.

  • A written cryptography policy that names encryption in transit as a requirement for defined connection types
  • An approved configuration baseline, reviewed when protocols are deprecated
  • Named owners for certificates, keys and the connections they protect

Configure for identity as well as secrecy

Encryption without authentication only protects against passive reading. Transport protection should verify the identity of the endpoint, normally through certificates issued by a trusted authority and checked by the connecting system. Self-signed or expired certificates that users are trained to click through destroy most of the value of the encrypted channel.

Where systems authenticate to each other, for example between services or between a managed provider and the entity, mutual authentication should be considered so both ends prove their identity. Administrative interfaces deserve particular care: they should not be reachable over unencrypted channels at all, and legacy protocols that cannot protect credentials should be disabled rather than merely discouraged.

Manage certificates as operational assets

Most transport encryption failures in practice are certificate failures: an expired certificate takes a service down, or a renewal quietly reverts a connection to a weaker configuration. Certificates should be inventoried with their expiry dates, owning team and renewal method, and renewals should be automated or diarised well ahead of expiry.

Revocation also needs a plan. If a private key is suspected to be compromised, the entity should be able to revoke the certificate, issue a replacement and confirm that dependent systems trust the new one. That sequence should be documented before it is needed in an incident, and the evidence kept with the rest of the Article 21 records.

Verify, test and keep the evidence

Configuration drifts. Periodic scanning of internal and external services shows which protocols and ciphers are actually offered, as opposed to what the standard says should be offered. Findings should be recorded with owners and correction dates, and exceptions - for example a legacy system that cannot support current protocols - should be risk-assessed, time-limited and compensated for in other ways.

ENISA's NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance discusses how entities can evidence the Article 21 measures in practice. Testing records, scan reports, certificate inventories and exception registers are the kinds of artefacts that show a supervisor the control is operating, not just written down.

Common weaknesses to look for

The patterns that most often weaken encryption in transit are mundane: mixed content and plaintext fallbacks on web services, unencrypted protocols left enabled for compatibility, email transport accepted without encryption between servers, supplier connections exempted from the baseline, and monitoring that checks whether a service is up but not how it is protected. Each is cheap to find with scanning and configuration review, and each is difficult to defend if an incident exposes it.

Encryption in transit also has limits that the wider control set has to cover. It does not protect data before it is sent or after it arrives, which is why it sits alongside access control, logging and vulnerability management in Article 21 rather than replacing them.

Points of clarification

Does NIS2 require TLS or a specific encryption standard?

No. Article 21(2)(h) requires policies and procedures on cryptography and, where appropriate, encryption; it does not name TLS or any algorithm. The entity must choose appropriate, current protections for its risks and be able to evidence the decisions. For providers in scope of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690, the annex gives more detailed requirements to test against.

Does encryption in transit apply to internal networks as well as the internet?

The Directive does not limit Article 21 measures to internet-facing connections. Connections inside the estate, including administrative access and traffic between sites or to suppliers, should be assessed on risk. Where internal traffic carries credentials, personal data or control functions, protecting it in transit is normally part of a proportionate response.

What evidence shows encryption in transit is operating?

A cryptography policy, a connection and certificate inventory, configuration baselines, periodic scan results with remediation records, and a documented exception process. Together these show the control is designed, implemented and checked, which is what supervision under the Directive is concerned with.

Further entries on this subject

The texts relied on

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