What Article 21 says about cryptography
The Directive identifies cryptography in Article 21(2)(h) as part of the minimum cybersecurity risk-management measures. It does not prescribe one identical encryption algorithm, key length or implementation architecture for every covered entity. Organisations must also consider the proportionality and all-hazards requirements in Article 21(1) and the law of the relevant Member State.
Cryptography can help protect confidentiality and integrity, verify origin and secure communications. It cannot repair poor access decisions or an unreliable recovery process. A policy should explain how cryptographic safeguards fit into the organisation's wider control framework.
Classify information and identify use cases
Map information flows, stored data, backup copies and credentials to the services they support. Determine the consequences if an attacker reads data, alters it, impersonates a service or interrupts access. This provides a basis for selecting encryption, digital signatures, hashing or other cryptographic techniques.
Distinguish storage encryption from transport encryption and application-level protection. A disk-encryption control may reduce exposure after theft of a device but not stop a signed-in attacker from reading files through an authorised application.
Document approved methods and ownership
A practical policy identifies approved cryptographic services, responsibilities, selection criteria and exceptions. Technical standards should specify acceptable protocols, certificate issuance practices and the conditions under which legacy methods must be replaced, without pretending a particular implementation is universally mandated by NIS2.
Assign responsibility for selecting and changing cryptographic components. Track dependencies on operating systems, cloud providers and managed services so teams know which party controls configuration and response to newly discovered weaknesses.
Govern keys, secrets and certificates
Control generation, storage, access, rotation, revocation, recovery and destruction of cryptographic keys as appropriate to their purpose. Do not store keys alongside encrypted material in a way that negates protection. Restrict administrative access to key-management systems and record exceptional operations.
Plan for expired certificates, compromised keys and unavailable key-management services. A well-encrypted dataset can become inaccessible if restoration procedures cannot recover the correct keys. Test recovery in a controlled environment and limit unnecessary copies of sensitive key material.
Assess effectiveness and plan cryptographic change
Inspect configuration, certificate inventories and key access records. Test whether encryption is enabled on the intended systems and whether transport connections reject unsafe configurations. When a safeguard fails, assign remediation and verify the result.
Review approved methods as technology and threats change. The detailed cryptography provisions of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 apply to specified types of digital and ICT providers, not automatically to every NIS2 entity; ENISA's related guidance should be used with that distinction.
Points of clarification
Does NIS2 mandate AES-256 for every system?
Article 21(2)(h) does not impose one universal algorithm for all covered entities. Specific national or applicable sector rules and the risk assessment may affect technical choices.
Does the cryptography policy need key management?
Key lifecycle and access management are important for making cryptographic controls effective. More detailed requirements apply to entities within the scope of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690.
Can a certificate inventory support compliance evidence?
Yes, alongside approved policies, configuration records, risk decisions and results from testing and remediation.